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ABSTRACT
Unexpected health events such as a heart attack or new cancer diagnosis are very common for
workers in their 50s and 60s. These health shocks can result in a significant loss in family income
if the worker reduces labor supply, but the family can also protect itself against this loss if the
worker's spouse increases labor supply, generating an "added worker effect." In this paper, I examine
the effect of health shocks on the labor supply of both spouses using the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS). I find that shocks lead the affected worker to reduce labor supply dramatically,
particularly if the shock is accompanied by a loss of functioning. I also find that the added worker
effect is small for men and that there is no such effect for women. There is some evidence to suggest
that families respond to health shocks in predictable ways depending on characteristics such as
access to retiree health insurance. The study concludes that health shocks result in real financial
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For people of near-retirement age, unexpected negative health events are unfortunately 
quite common.  For example, workers in their 50s and 60s in the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) have a 5% chance of having a heart attack, stroke, or new cancer diagnosis, a 10% chance 
of being diagnosed with a new chronic illness, and a 3% chance of having an accidental injury 
over a two-year period.  These negative health events, or health shocks, are likely to lead some 
affected individuals to decrease their labor supply, resulting in a loss in lifetime income for the 
family.   
To protect the family against this loss, the worker’s spouse may increase his or her labor 
supply, effectively providing within-family insurance against the effects of the negative event.  
Yet this expected response may fail to materialize for several reasons.  First, the response of both 
spouses to the health shock is likely to be complicated by the family’s access to employer-
provided and government benefits such as health insurance, disability insurance, and pensions.   
If the family’s only access to health insurance is through the affected spouse’s employer, for 
example, then the family may not be able to shift labor supply towards the healthy spouse; if the 
family has access to government-provided disability benefits, then this may “crowd out” the 
expected increase in the spouse’s labor supply.  Second, the health shock may change the value 
of time the spouses spend together, for example because the affected spouse needs more 
assistance with activities of daily living or has a shortened expected lifespan.  Thus, the expected 
response to a health shock is theoretically ambiguous and may differ across families. 
The purpose of this study is to explore the effect of negative health shocks, such as heart 
attacks or new cancer diagnoses, on the labor supply decisions of both spouses.  Understanding 
these labor supply responses and their interaction with employer-provided and government   2 
 
benefits may provide insights into the well-being of young elderly families, the retirement 
decision-making process of two-earner households, and the optimal design of these benefit 
programs.  This analysis is similar to studies such as Gruber and Cullen (2000) that look for an 
“added worker effect” (AWE) of wives’ increasing their labor supply when husbands become 
unemployed, but explores the AWE in the context of a negative health shock rather than an 
unemployment shock.  This analysis also provides a link between the large literature on the 
effect of health status and health insurance on retirement and the small but growing literature on 
couples’ labor supply decisions by carefully considering the effect of health on labor supply in a 
family context.   
The analysis uses the first six waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a recent, 
nationally representative survey of the young elderly with extensive information on health, labor 
force status, and demographics.  The analysis proceeds in several steps.  First, I examine the 
effect of health shocks on own labor supply and find that health shocks have a very significant 
effect, particularly a “severe” shock that is accompanied by a large decrease in functioning.  An 
acute event such as a heart attack increases men’s probability of labor force exit over two years 
by 35 percentage points if it is severe, or nearly double the 19 percent baseline average 
probability of exit.   For women, the comparable effect is a 23 percentage point increase, which 
is very large relative to their 19 percent baseline exit rate. 
Second, I estimate the aggregate spousal response to health shocks, which is expected to 
be positive due to the AWE in the absence of complicating factors such as those mentioned 
above.  I find that a spouse’s health shock elicits only a small labor supply increase for men and 
no significant increase for women; in fact, women decrease labor supply when their husband’s   3 
 
shock is severe.  This suggests that the average AWE in the work force as a whole is quite small 
and that families experience a real loss in lifetime income when they suffer a health shock.   
Third, I interact the health shocks dummies with other characteristics, such as access to 
health insurance and retirement benefits, to test the hypothesis that families’ responses to health 
shocks differ from what the simple AWE theory suggests in predictable ways that relate to these 
characteristics.  The evidence for this is more mixed – in some cases, families respond as 
expected, for example by the husband exiting the labor force with greater probability when a sick 
wife is pension-eligible, but these effects are often not consistent for men and women or across 
benefit types.  An explanation is proposed and tested for one of the gender differences, but other 
differences remain a puzzle.     
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the theoretical 
motivation for the analysis and previous literature on the topic.  Section III discusses the data and 
empirical strategy.  Section IV presents the empirical results, first for models incorporating only 
the effect of own health shocks, then for models that also incorporate the spouse’s health shocks.  




  The theory of spousal labor supply as insurance against negative shocks is developed in 
the context of unemployment in papers by Ashenfelter (1980), Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) 
and Lundberg (1985), and is summarized by Gruber and Cullen (2000).  In a simple model, the 
negative shock results in a loss of lifetime income, which will cause the spouse to increase their 
labor supply, assuming that their leisure is a normal good – this is known as the Added Worker   4 
 
Effect (AWE).  Furthermore, the increased time at home of the affected spouse may lower the 
opportunity cost of work for the other spouse if there is substitution in home production, 
strengthening the AWE.  An additional reason to expect a spousal labor supply increase in the 
context of health shocks is that the family may be liquidity constrained if they have not reached 
the Social Security eligibility age and cannot tap in to retirement wealth to smooth consumption. 
  As discussed briefly above, there are several reasons why a negative health shock might 
not cause the spouse to increase their labor supply.  First, there may be complementarity rather 
than substitution in spousal leisure; indeed, this is the conclusion of most studies on couples’ 
retirement.  Further, a negative health shock could strengthen complementarity of leisure if the 
affected spouse requires assistance with activities of daily living (and the family prefers to have 
the spouse provide this care) or has a shortened life expectancy.  Second, the access of the family 
to employer-provided and government benefits may crowd out the spousal labor supply 
response.  Thus the spousal labor supply response to a health shock is theoretically ambiguous 
and is expected to differ across families according to the importance of these factors. 
 
Previous Literature 
The large existing literature on health and retirement is relevant for this analysis. One 
method used in this literature is to include self-reported health status or work limitations in the 
retirement model.  Studies using this method have found large effects of health on retirement.
1  
However, this method is subject to measurement error, as individuals’ subjective judgements of 
what constitutes poor health may vary substantially, and to endogeneity concerns, as self-
reported measures may not be independent of labor force outcomes if people rationalize their 
                                                            
1 See, for example, Diamond and Hausman (1984) or Hanoch and Honig (1983). 
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retirement status by claiming a health problem (the “justification hypothesis”), so estimates may 
understate or overstate the true importance of health.  A second set of studies uses objective 
measures of health such as information on medical conditions or subsequent mortality.
2  These 
measures are imperfectly correlated with working capacity, making estimates subject to 
measurement error; studies using these measures find smaller effects of health on retirement.  A 
third set of papers instrument for self-reported measures with objective measures.
3   
There is no consensus on the preferred method of estimating the effect of health on 
retirement.   Although Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) report little evidence of the justification 
hypothesis or of measurement error in objective health measures, Bound (1991) finds evidence 
of both and shows that instrumenting for self-reported measures with objective measures may 
lead to bias in estimating the effect of other explanatory variables.  Baker et. al. (2004) compares 
self-reports of objective measures of health such as cancer status with data from health records 
and finds that there is considerable error in the self-reports and that the error is correlated with 
labor force status, providing a further rationale against using objective measures . 
  McClellan (1998) uses negative health shocks that occur between waves 1 and 2 of the 
HRS, such as a heart attack or new cancer diagnosis, to estimate the effect of health on own labor 
supply, while Smith (2003) looks at the effect of health shocks on labor supply, medical 
expenditures, and family income and wealth.  The appeal of this approach is that it exploits the 
arrival of unexpected new information about health to estimate the effect of changes in health on 
                                                            
2 See, for example, Anderson and Burkhauser (1985), Bazzoli (1985), and Chirikos and Nestel (1984). 
 
3 See, for example, Stern (1989) and Bound et. al. (1999). 
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changes in labor supply.
4  This approach avoids the justification hypothesis concern by not using 
self-reported health status and more generally addresses the potential problem of (time-invariant) 
unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with both health and retirement.  Shocks are defined 
based on objective health information, so this method is still subject to the concerns raised above 
about these measures.
5 
As this study explores labor supply in a family context, the literature on couples’ 
retirement decisions is also relevant.  Structural models of joint retirement are estimated in 
several studies, including Hurd (1990), Maestas (2001), and Gustman and Steinmeier (2000); 
these authors employ different models, but all find that complementarity of leisure is a key factor 
in explaining why husbands and wives often retire simultaneously.  A second set of studies, 
including Baker (2002), Coile (2004), and Johnson and Favreault (2001), estimate reduced-form 
models exploring the cross effects of one spouse’s characteristics on the other spouse’s 
retirement decision; Coile (2004) finds that husbands are more responsive to wives’ financial 
incentives for retirement than vice versa, so the symmetry of spousal labor supply responses will 
be examined here.  A feature common to both sets of studies, however, is that they either do not 
control for health or do so using self-reported health status.
6 
                                                            
4 An important assumption underlying this approach is that health shocks are, in fact, unexpected.  Smith (2003) 
finds that gender, race, education, health status, body-mass index, and behaviors like drinking, smoking, and 
exercise are all significant predictors of future major health events such as heart attacks.  Nonetheless, there will 
obviously be a good deal of uncertainty regarding whether any individual will have a health event conditional on his 
risk factors and even more uncertainty regarding the timing of the health event, assuming that individuals are even 
aware of the link between the risk factors and health events. 
 
5 However, much of the analysis here focuses on health shocks that are accompanied by a major loss in functioning, 
and Baker et. al. (2004) find that the probability of reporting error drops with the severity of the health condition. 
 
6 Johnson and Favreault (2001) control for both self-reported health status and an objective measure, the number of 
functional impairments, in the analysis.  However, that study does not look at the change in functional impairments 
or in other health measures over time, as is done here, or explore whether the effect of health measures on the 
spouse’s labor supply depends on factors such as the family’s access to health insurance.    7 
 
This paper offers a number of contributions relative to the previous literature.  Along 
with McClellan (1998) and Smith (2003), this is the only paper in the retirement literature to 
utilize health shocks to estimate the effect of health on labor supply.  But relative to these two 
studies, this paper utilizes more waves of the HRS data and provides a greater focus on how the 
labor supply response may depend on the severity of the shock, how spouses respond to health 
shocks, and how the labor supply response to health shocks may depend on the availability of 
employer-provided and government benefits.  This focus is useful for assessing the effect of 
health shocks on family well-being, understanding the retirement decisions of two-earner 
households, and informing policy makers about the ideal design of benefit programs.  This paper 
also extends the literature on the AWE by considering the extent to which spousal labor supply 
serves as within-family insurance against health shocks.     
 
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
  The data for the project is the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which began in 1992 
as a longitudinal study of persons born between 1931 and 1941 and their spouses, with re-
interviews of these 7,500 households every two years.  Data from the first six waves of the 
survey, 1992-2002, is used here (wave 6 data is preliminary).  The principal advantage of the 
HRS is that it provides richly detailed information on health, labor supply, and demographic 
characteristics for a sample of near-retirement age households and follows them over time.   
  Samples of married male workers and married female workers are used in the analysis.  
The samples are constructed using the 4,617 married couples who are in the survey at wave 1 
and are observed for at least two consecutive waves.  Men (women) contribute a person-wave 
observation to the male (female) sample for every wave in which they are between the ages of 50   8 
 
and 69 and were working at the previous wave.
7   The final sample size is 11,006 male person-
wave observations and 9,592 female person-wave observations. 
   The empirical strategy is to exploit exogenous shocks to health between waves of the 
survey to explore the effect of health on one’s own and one’s spouse’s labor supply.  
Specifically, I estimate regressions of the following form:  
  it it it it it it spouseX ownX k spouseshoc ownshock exitLF e b b b b + + + + + = 3 2 1 0   (1) 
where: exitLF is a dummy variable for whether individual i who was working at the previous 
wave (time t-1) has retired by the current wave (time t), ownshock and spouseshock are dummy 
variables for whether the worker and his or her spouse have experienced a health shock since the 
previous wave, and X is a set of demographic characteristics including exact age dummy 
variables, education dummies, industry and occupation dummies, net worth and liquid assets, 
and wave dummies.  This model is estimated separately for male and female workers.  This 
model is also estimated for the same samples of workers with an alternative dependent variable, 
the change in hours since the previous wave, to incorporate the effect of health shocks on both 
the hours and participation decisions.
8 
  Following McClellan (1998), three types of health shocks are examined: acute health 
events (heart attack, stroke, new cancer), onset of new chronic illnesses (diabetes, lung disease, 
                                                            
7 There are no person-wave observations from wave 1 in the sample because it impossible to determine whether 
health problems reported at wave 1 began within the past two years or at an earlier point in time.  The sample is not 
conditional on the spouse working at the previous wave, so it is possible that a household will contribute a person-
wave observation to the male sample but not the female sample or vice versa.   The sample is conditioned on 
working at the past wave but does not exclude persons who have previously retired and re-entered the labor force, so 
it is possible that an individual may retire twice during the sample period.  The effect of health on the labor-force re-
entry decision is discussed in more detail below. 
 
8 An alternative specification defining labor force exit as switching from reporting oneself to be not retired or partly 
retired to completely retired yields qualitative similar results to the estimates of equation (1).   Alternative analyses 
that are not conditional on work at the previous wave and analyses of labor force re-entry will be discussed below.  
   9 
 
heart failure, and arthritis), and accidental injuries or falls.
9  Another key health variable is the 
functional impairment index.  The index is based on whether the individual reports any difficulty 
in performing a series of seventeen activities of daily living (ADL), such as walking, climbing 
stairs, lifting ten pounds, and getting out of bed; the index ranges from 0 (difficulty in no 
activities) to 1 (difficulty in all 17 activities).
10   The analysis also makes use of the self-reported 
survival probabilities, as health shocks provide new information about mortality and this may 
influence labor supply decisions. 
  Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the male and female samples.  Over a two-year 
period, the typical male worker has a 19% chance of exiting the labor force, and the average 
change in annual hours for men (including both labor force exits and marginal hours changes) is 
a decrease of 375 hours.  Over a two-year period, nearly 7% of men experience acute health 
events, 11% are diagnosed with a new chronic illness, 4% are injured in an accident, and 19% 
have at least one of these health events.  The typical male reports difficulty performing 10% of 
the 17 activities of daily living and has experienced a 1.5% increase in the ADL index during the 
past two years; he rates his odds of living to age 75 as 66%.
11  The average age of the male 
                                                            
9 Measures are constructed so as to be as compatible across waves as possible.  An analysis of health shocks by 
wave indicates that the incidence of shocks is fairly constant over time.  Measures are also constructed to be similar 
to McClellan (1998); the most significant difference is the exclusion of back pain from chronic illness, due to 
implausibly large fluctuations in the number of new diagnoses in later waves.   
  
10 The number of difficulty categories offered to respondents for the ADL questions changes across waves.  In 
creating the index, individuals reporting any level of difficulty are treated as impaired, as this is the only measure 
available for all waves.  On average, individuals are 1-2% more disabled at each passing wave; however, individuals 
are 4% less disabled at wave 2 than wave 1, presumably due to the change in definition.  To make the measure more 
comparable across time, I decrease each individual’s wave 1 impairment index by one activity (roughly 6%).   
 
11 This corresponds well with the actual probability of living to age 75 from the life tables, which is 0.68 for the 
average man in the sample.  Interestingly, men greatly overestimate their probability of living to age 85 (sample 
average of 0.45 vs. 0.32 from life tables), while women underestimate their probability of living to age 75 (sample 
average of 0.68 vs. 0.78 from life tables) but make an accurate predication regarding age 85; Hurd and McGarry 
(1995) have a similar finding.  The change in the self-reported probability of living to 75 is flat in the sample; 
surviving an additional year is associated with a decrease in life expectancy of approximately 0.8 years for this 
sample, so that the probability of living to a given age should rise modestly as the individual ages. 
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sample is 60.  The sample statistics for women are similar, except as noted.  The average change 
in women’s hours, a decrease of 284 hours, is somewhat smaller than that for men, though the 
rate of labor force exit is very similar, suggesting that women are more likely to engage in part-
time work.  Women have a slightly lower risk of an acute event or of any health shock and a 
higher average level of difficulty on the ADL index, 14%.  The typical female in the sample is 
two years younger than the typical male.     
 
IV. RESULTS 
Basic Results Excluding Spouse Variables 
  The first set of results explores the effect of health shocks on own retirement, ignoring 
any response to the spouse’s health shocks.  Table 2a presents linear probability model estimates 
of equation (1) using labor force exit as the dependent variable.
12  All specifications include 
dummies for age, education, occupation/industry, and year, as well as net worth and liquid 
assets.  In the first specification, an acute health event is estimated to lead to a 16.1 percentage 
point increase in the probability of labor force exit; this effect is highly significant and quite 
large relative to the average probability of exit of 18.5 percent.
  The onset of a new chronic 
illness raises the probability of exit by 5.4 percentage points and an accident raises the 
probability of exit by 2.4 percentage points, but only the former effect is significant. 
The average labor supply response to health shocks in the sample likely masks substantial 
heterogeneity.  Not all heart attacks are created equal, and workers who suffer a greater loss in 
working capability should adjust their labor supply by a greater amount.  The second 
                                                            
12 In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the person level to correct for arbitrary forms of serial 
correlation in the error term over time.  Estimating the linear probability models as probits yields qualitatively 
similar results. 
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specification tests this hypothesis by adding a dummy variable indicating a large change in the 
ADL index (difficulty with 4 or more new ADLs) since the previous wave, the value of the ADL 
index at the previous wave, and interactions between the ADL change dummy and the health 
shock dummies.
13  The coefficients indicate that the effect of an acute health event is greatly 
magnified when it is accompanied by a large loss of functioning: the effect of an acute event 
without a large ADL change is an 8.8 percentage point increase in the probability of exit, but this 
effect is 25.8 percentage points greater when there is a large ADL change, so that the total effect 
of a “severe” health shock is a 34.6 percentage point increase.
14  The ADL change dummy has an 
independent effect of 10.6 percentage points; functioning difficulties may also have long-term 
effects on labor force exit, as the past ADL index has a positive and significant coefficient.  The 
ADL interactions with the chronic illness and accident dummies are smaller and not significant.  
A health shock not only affects an individual’s working capacity but also may provide 
new information about life expectancy, which may affect the worker’s labor supply decision.  
The third specification examines this by adding a dummy variable indicating a significant change 
in the self-reported survival probability to age 75 (a decrease greater than 20%) since the 
previous wave, the survival probability from the previous wave, and interactions of the survival 
change dummy with the health event dummies.
15  The effect is similar to that in the previous 
specification: an acute health event leads to a 10.4 percentage point increase in the probability of 
exit if it is not accompanied by a large change in mortality probability vs. a 22.2 percentage point 
increase if it is.  The mortality change dummy and interactions of this with the chronic illness 
                                                            
13 Approximately 20% of respondents with a health shock meet the criteria for a large change in the ADL index. 
 
14 An alternative explanation for this finding is that there is measurement error in the definition of a health shock and 
that a “severe” health shock is measured with less error.  This would be consistent with the finding of Baker et. al. 
(2004) that there is less measurement error in objective reports of health when the condition is more serious. 
 
15 Results are quite similar if the cutoff is a 10% decrease or a 25% decrease in survival probabilities.   12 
 
and accident dummies are not significant, though the past mortality coefficient indicates that 
those who expect to live longer are less likely to retire. 
Estimates of equation (1) using the change in annual hours worked as the dependent 
variable are also shown in Table 2a.  This measure includes both labor force exits and marginal 
hours changes.  Marginal hours changes are in fact quite common; for example, nearly one-third 
of those working at the previous wave reported higher annual hours two years later.  A health 
shock is estimated to reduce average annual hours by 318 for an acute event, by 146 for a new 
chronic illness, and by 70 for an accident; the first two effects are statistically significant and 
fairly large relative to the baseline average decrease of 375 hours.
16  As before, the response to a 
health shock depends critically on the severity of the shock.  An acute event is associated with a 
reduction in annual hours of 160 if not accompanied by a significant loss of functioning vs. 746 
if it is; it also is associated with a reduction in hours of 217 if not accompanied by a significant 
reduction in life expectancy vs. 454 if it is.   
The results for women are shown in Table 2b. Overall, the results for men and women are 
very similar.  The coefficients for women are somewhat smaller in absolute terms than those 
estimated for men, though for the change in hours specifications the coefficients are very similar 
when compared relative to the average change in hours.  To cite a few key results, an acute event 
increases the probability of women’s labor force exit by 9.7 percentage points on average, or by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
16 The effects of health shocks estimated here are smaller than those reported in McClellan (1998).  Upon closer 
examination, I find that the effect of an acute event occurring between waves 1 and 2 is significantly larger than the 
effect of later health shocks, particularly for strokes and men’s cancers.  One possible explanation is that there have 
been advances in medical care during the sample period that allow affected individuals to continue working.  As the 
HRS sample is aging over time, a second possibility is that people who experienced a health shock at a younger age 
may have a bigger response to it; however, this would not explain why the response fell between waves 2 and 3 but 
was flat thereafter or why this drop was seen only for certain types of health shocks.  
   13 
 
22.9 percentage points if it is a “severe” event accompanied by a significant loss of functioning 
vs. by 4.0 percentage points if not. 
 
Specification Checks and Extensions of Basic Results 
While the preceding analysis suggests a large impact of health shocks on labor supply, 
the true impact could be even larger if shocks have long-term effects.  I first address this by 
adding dummy variables for whether the respondent has ever had an acute health event or 
chronic illness diagnosis.
17  I find that these variables have a modest (3-5 percentage point) and 
significant effect on the probability of labor force exit for men and that past chronic illness has a 
similar effect for women; the effect of current shocks is unchanged by the inclusion of these 
dummies.  To assess whether the effect of shocks diminishes over time, I estimate the model 
separately for each wave of the data using as many lags of the health shock dummies as are 
available; I find that while the coefficients on the lagged health shock dummies generally have 
the expected sign, indicating a persistent effect of shocks, sample sizes are too small for any 
consistent pattern to emerge as far as the rate of decay of the shock’s effect.
18         
To consider the full impact of health shocks on labor supply, we must also examine their 
effect on re-entry decisions.  Health shocks may have an even larger effect on labor supply if 
they deter re-entry; conversely, shocks may have a smaller effect if some of the reaction is 
temporary and workers later re-enter the labor force.  To assess these possibilities, I re-estimate 
the specifications described in the preceding paragraph using labor force re-entry as the 
dependent variable.   I find that having a health shock decreases the probability of  re-entry by 3 
                                                            
17 These and other results discussed in the text but not included in the tables are available from the author upon 
request. 
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to 4 percentage points and that the effect is similar for shocks experienced within the past two 
years and those experienced further in the past.  The specification with lagged shock dummies 
shows no consistent pattern of decay in the effect of the shock, suggesting that the initial 
reduction in labor supply may be permanent. 
As an additional check, I probe the large estimated effect of acute health events on labor 
supply by breaking this dummy into its component parts, dummies for heart attack, stroke, and 
new cancer diagnosis, and re-estimating the model with these dummies.   Interestingly, I find that 
for men, the effect of a heart attack on the probability of labor force exit (22 percentage points) is 
larger than that of a stroke (16) or cancer (8), while for women, a stroke has a bigger effect (14 
percentage points) than a heart attack (5) or cancer (8); these effects are statistically significant 
(except for women’s heart attack) and are typically significantly different from each other.   
 
Basic Results Including Spouse Health Shocks   
To assess the spousal response to health shocks, the models are expanded by adding an 
equivalent set of health shock variables for the spouse and the spouse’s demographic variables.  
The coefficients on the spousal health shock variables resulting from this exercise are shown in 
Tables 3a and 3b; although not reported on the tables, the effects of own health variables are 
virtually identical to the earlier results.
19   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
18 Sample selection is a concern in this analysis with lagged health shock dummies, as many of the workers who 
experienced more severe health shocks are likely to have exited the labor force early on.  
 
19 The samples for this analysis are the same as described earlier; a small number of observations are lost due to 
missing data on spousal characteristics.   The male (female) sample is conditional on men (women) being in the 
labor force at the previous wave, but there is no sample selection criteria regarding the spouse’s participation.  
Restricting the sample to couples in which both were working at the past wave yields similar results; including 
couples in which neither worked yields similar results for the effect of spousal health shocks, though the effects of 
own health shocks are smaller because many retired people who experience shocks do not change their labor supply.      15 
 
In the simplest specification for men (columns 1 and 5 on Table 3a), a wife’s health 
shock is associated with a decrease in the probability of exiting the labor force or an increase in 
hours, as predicted by the AWE.  The effects are small relative to the effects of own health 
shocks, on the order of a 1.5 percentage point decrease in the probability of retirement or an 
increase of 50 hours, and are not statistically significant, although replacing the individual health 
shock dummies with a single dummy variable for any type of health shock (columns 2 and 6) 
yields a significant coefficient in the hours regression.  For women (Table 3b), a husband’s 
health shock is not consistently associated with an increase in labor supply as predicted by the 
AWE and the coefficients are small and insignificant, whether several health shock dummies or a 
single dummy is used.   
In the remaining columns of Tables 3a and 3b, the any health shock dummy is interacted 
with dummies for a significant loss in functioning or decrease in survival probability to explore 
whether the response to a spousal health shock depends on its severity.  For men, the effect of a 
severe health shock is similar to that of any shock; if anything, the AWE may be slightly larger 
when the shock is severe, though the interaction coefficients are not significant.  Women, on the 
other hand, decrease labor supply when the spouse’s health shock is severe. The effect is about 6 
percentage points, or one-third of baseline retirement, and the interaction coefficients are 
significant at the 10% level or better in both labor force exit models; the interaction coefficients 
in the hours models also indicate a decrease in labor supply but are insignificant.   
Taken together with the large reductions in own labor supply shown in Tables 2a-2b, 
these results suggest that the family suffers a substantial loss in income when one spouse 
experiences a health shock.  Husbands whose wives experience a health shock may increase 
labor supply slightly, but it is a small effect compared to the reduction in the wife’s labor   16 
 
supply.
20  Wives have no labor supply response to an average spousal health shock and actually 
reduce labor supply substantially when the shock is severe. 
These results raise two interesting questions – why is the estimated AWE small and often 
insignificant and why are there different responses by men and women, particularly to a severe 
shock?  One possible answer to the first question is that different workers may in fact be 
responding to a spouse’s health shock in predictable but offsetting ways – for example, with one 
worker working less to provide care for a spouse and another working more to provide health 
insurance coverage for the family – generating a net zero effect in aggregate.  If certain of these 
motivations are more important for men or women, this might also help to explain some of the 
gender differences in the results.  The remaining sections of the paper explore the how labor 
supply responses to health shocks depend on complementarity of leisure and care-giving motives 
and on the family’s access to employer-provided and government benefits.       
 
Complementarity of Leisure and Caregiving 
One reason why the AWE may fail to materialize is that there may be complementarity in 
leisure for older couples – if older people enjoy their leisure time more when their spouse is with 
them, then the health-related retirement of one spouse may lead the other to retire as well.   Most 
studies have found complementarity of leisure to be an important determinant of retirement 
decisions, and Coile (2004) suggests that this effect may be stronger for men than for women.  If 
this were true here, though, it would work against finding a larger AWE for men.  However, a 
hypothesis that could explain the observed gender differences in the results is that a severe health 
                                                            
20 Indeed, an analysis of the effect of health shocks on total family hours shows that hours fall as a result of a shock 
(particularly for an acute event such as a heart attack), whether the shock is experienced by the husband or the wife.  
Smith (2003) finds that family income falls as a result of a health shock. 
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shock may differentially affect the complementarity of leisure for men and women.  Specifically, 
if this event reduces the complementarity of leisure for men and increases it for women, for 
example because women are more willing to take on additional responsibilities around the house 
when their spouse falls ill, that would be consistent with men increasing labor supply and women 
decreasing labor supply as a result of a spouse’s severe health shock.   
To test this theory, I make use of the question in the HRS about whether the respondent 
finds time spent together with their spouse to be enjoyable (on a 4-point scale – extremely, very, 
somewhat, or not too enjoyable, where 1 is extremely enjoyable), and treat this as a proxy for 
complementarity of leisure.   The test involves regressing the change in this index since the last 
wave on the value of the index at the last wave and the health shock variables for each spouse.  
The same model is estimated for each spouse via seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), and the 
coefficients on the spouse’s health shock variables in each regression are tested for equality.  As 
the question about enjoyment of time together was only asked of all respondents in waves 1 and 
2, this analysis is based on the change between those waves only. 
The results of this analysis are shown on Table 4.  The average value of the index is 1.83 
for men and 1.96 for women and the average change in the index is small, about 0.03 for both 
men and women.  For women, there is essentially no effect of a severe health shock on the index, 
while for men, a decline in the wife’s level of functioning is associated with a highly significant 
increase of 0.33 in the index (a decrease in complementarity of leisure).  The hypothesis that 
these coefficients on the spouse’s change in functioning dummy are equal is easily rejected at the 
5% significance level.   This exercise lends support to the hypothesis that differences in how men 
and women respond to a spouse’s severe health shock could be driven in part by differences in 
its effect on their enjoyment of time spent with their spouse.      18 
 
A second hypothesis to explain the gender differences in the results is that women may 
be more likely to decrease labor supply in order to provide care for a sick spouse.  One way to 
explore the role of caregiving is to look at the effect of having adult children living within 10 
miles prior to the shock, as these children can serve as alternate caregivers.
21  The key 
coefficients from this exercise are not statistically significant, so the results are discussed only 
briefly, but they suggest at least the possibility of a differential response by gender.  For men, 
having kids nearby allows them to reduce the probability of exit by 2.1 percentage points more 
or increase hours by 75 more in response to a spouse’s health shock than if kids were not nearby; 
these effects are comparable in size to the effects shown on Table 3a and the coefficients in the 
two models are of opposite sign as expected.  For women, the coefficients are smaller, do not 
have the opposite sign, and are not significant.  Thus it is possible that men make greater use of 
the presence of other potential caregivers to increase labor supply in response to a spouse’s 
health shock, which could contribute to men’s having a larger AWE. 
 
Health Insurance 
The family’s response to health shocks may also be affected by its access to employer-
provided and government benefits.
 22  Table 5 explores the role of health insurance by 
augmenting the basic model with dummy variables for whether each spouse had employer-
provided health insurance and retiree heath insurance at the last wave, as well as an interaction of 
                                                            
21 An alternative method is simply compare whether husbands who have suffered a severe health shock are more 
likely to receive assistance with ADLs from their wives than comparable wives are from their husbands; in fact, 
husbands are slightly more likely to receive such assistance  (21% to 18%).  Yet it is difficult to conclude from this 
that the desire to provide care has a causal effect on labor supply decisions, as women may reduce labor supply in 
response to a spouse’s health shock for other reasons and simply provide assistance because it is convenient to do 
so.  The method discussed in the text is a cleaner, if less direct, way of assessing the role of caregiving in labor 
supply decisions. 
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the retiree insurance and any health shock dummies to test whether access to insurance is more 
important for families who have experienced health shocks.  For simplicity, I focus on the results 
for labor force exit; results for changes in hours are similar.  
The coefficient on own employer-provided health insurance may be negative if jobs with 
insurance have other attractive attributes that make people less likely to retire; indeed, having 
such insurance reduces the probability of exit by 4.2 percentage points for men and 8.5 
percentage points for women and both effects are highly significant.  Having retiree health 
insurance increases the probability of exit as expected, by 5.9 percentage points for men and 5.1 
percentage points for women, and both effects are highly significant.  However, this effect is not 
significantly larger for employees who have had a health shock.    
Having one’s spouse have retiree health insurance may increase the probability of exit by 
removing the need to work to provide insurance for the spouse and this effect may be stronger in 
families where the spouse has had a health shock.  For men, this is the case – the wife’s having 
retiree health insurance increases the probability of exit by 2.4 percentage points and the effect is 
3.2 percentage points larger when she has had a health shock; the former effect is significant at 
the 10% level, though the latter is not significant and thus is suggestive only.  For women, the 
husband’s retiree health insurance has no effect on labor supply.  In sum, access to retiree health 
insurance through one’s employer facilitates retirement for both men and women, and this access 
is equally important for those who have and have not experienced a health shock.  Further, the 
wife’s access to retiree health insurance appears to facilitate retirement for men, but there is no 
similar effect for women.       
                                                                                                                                                                                           
22 Several studies, including Blau and Gilleski (2001) and Gruber and Madrian (1995), have found access to health 




Families may be able to weather a health shock without a spousal labor supply response 
if they have access to retirement benefits.  To test this hypothesis, the models in Table 6 add 
dummy variables for whether each spouse is eligible for Social Security or a private pension and 
for whether each has applied for or received Disability Insurance benefits (DI) since the last 
wave; the Social Security and pension dummies are also interacted with the any shock dummy to 
test whether benefit access is more important for families who have had health shocks.
23   
If the respondent is eligible for Social Security or a pension, this is associated with a 
large and statistically significant decrease in labor supply; however, the effects are not larger for 
those who have had health shocks.   The effects of the spouse being eligible for these benefits are 
generally insignificant, with one interesting exception: men whose wives have a health shock and 
are pension-eligible are 6.2 percentage points more likely to retire, suggesting that wives’ 
pensions may crowd out the AWE.  Surprisingly, though, women with comparable husbands are 
3.4 percentage points less likely to retire.  Both effects are significant at the 10% level or better.        
Among the DI variables, applying for benefits should be associated with an increased 
probability of exiting the labor force, as applicants by law are not allowed to work; being a 
recipient will be associated with a further labor supply reduction if rejected applicants are more 
likely to be working than accepted applicants.  The estimates in Table 7 reflect this – applicants 
are about 50 percentage points more likely to exit the labor force and recipients are a further 15-
20 percentage points more likely to exit, and all effects are highly significant.   
                                                            
23 Social Security eligibility is defined here as being age 62 or older.  Exact age dummies remain in the model.  The 
Social Security dummy may pick up a general effect of being age 62 or older as well as the effect of benefit 
eligibility.  
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It is expected that having a spouse apply for DI may be associated with an increase in 
labor supply due to the AWE, while having a spouse receive DI may be associated with a 
decrease in labor supply if the DI benefits crowd out the AWE.  For women, the coefficients on 
the spouse’s DI variables have the expected signs and there is a large and statistically significant 
decrease of 296 hours if the husband is awarded DI benefits, suggesting that there may be crowd 
out of the AWE.  For men, there is an increased probability of labor force exit if the wife is 
awarded DI benefits, but it is not significant and the effect on hours is wrong-signed.  Thus the 
evidence of crowd out of the AWE by retirement benefits is mixed. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Health events such as heart attacks or new diagnoses of chronic illnesses have a large 
effect on labor supply decisions for both men and women, particularly when accompanied by 
significant losses in functioning.  Men who have experienced an acute event such as a heart 
attack or stroke that results in a large loss of functioning are 35 percentage points more likely to 
exit the labor force over a two-year period; comparable women are 23 percentage points more 
likely to exit. 
The average response of workers to a spouse’s health shocks is a small AWE for men and 
no significant increase in labor supply for women; women actually decrease labor supply when 
the husband’s shock is accompanied by a loss of functioning or a reduction in life expectancy.  
The lack of a strong AWE and the gender differences in the results may be explained in part by 
families responding to shocks in predictable but offsetting ways based on characteristics such as 
complementarity of leisure, caregiving needs, and access to employer-provided and government 
benefits.   For example, evidence suggests that husbands may not exit the labor force when the   22 
 
wife experiences a severe health shock because of a weakening of his traditionally stronger 
complementarity of leisure effect and that men may increase labor supply in response to a wife’s 
health shock when substitute caregivers are available. 
There is some evidence that the availability of employer-provided and government 
benefits affects workers’ responses to their own and their spouses’ health shocks in predictable 
ways, though these effects are often not consistent for men and women or across benefit types.  
Husbands reduce labor supply when their wives have access to retiree health insurance or private 
pension benefits, and wives reduce labor supply when their husbands have access to Disability 
Insurance benefits.   
These findings have several notable implications.  First, the study finds that health shocks 
represent real financial losses for the family, as any labor supply increase by the spouse is 
swamped by the large labor supply decrease by the affected individual.  This suggests that health 
shocks are an important source of financial risk for near-retirement-age households and that there 
may be welfare gains from providing insurance against this risk.  Second, the study supports the 
recent trend in the retirement literature to examine retirement in a household context, as it finds 
that the spouse’s characteristics can have important effects on the worker’s retirement decision 
for both men and women.  Third, the results regarding employer-provided and government 
benefits may be of particular interest to policy makers, as they suggest that some families may be 
constrained in responding to health shocks by a lack of access to health insurance and that there 
may be some crowd out of spousal labor supply by DI benefits.  Future research may help to 
explain why men’s and women’s responses to health shocks are not always symmetric.       
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Variable
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
Labor Force Variables
  Exited Labor Force 0.185 0.189
  Change in Hours -375 1,026 -284 860
Health Variables
  Acute Health Event 0.067 0.050
  New Chronic Illness 0.107 0.098
  Accident 0.036 0.030
  Any Health Shock 0.191 0.167
  Past Acute Event 0.122 0.109
  Past Chronic Illness 0.475 0.546
  ADL Index 0.103 0.141 0.141 0.161
  Change in ADL Index 0.015 0.122 0.011 0.130
  Self-Reported Prob Live to 75 0.660 0.274 0.684 0.267
  Change in Prob Live to 75 0.002 0.266 0.000 0.259
Demographics
  Age 60.4 4.1 58.3 4.5
  Educ: <HS 0.234 0.188
  Educ: HS 0.320 0.407
  Educ: Some college 0.198 0.228
  Educ: College 0.111 0.080
  Net Worth (median) 138,000 1,190,334 135,000 1,125,822
  Liquid Assets (median) 5,000 249,060 4,000 262,320
Number of Person-Wave Obs 11,006 9,592
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Male Sample Female Sample
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Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Acute Event Dummy 0.161 0.088 0.104 -317.7 -159.7 -216.8
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (43.7) (46.1) (58.1)
Chronic Illness Dummy 0.054 0.031 0.042 -145.8 -91.8 -86.8
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (34.1) (36.2) (43.9)
Accident Dummy 0.024 0.003 0.069 -69.6 -20.0 -172.7
(0.022) (0.023) (0.033) (55.1) (58.9) (87.8)
Increase in ADL Dummy 0.106 -219.8
     (change>=4 activities) (0.018) (46.8)
Past ADL (0-1 Index) 0.238 -337.8
(0.034) (74.8)
Acute * ADL Change 0.258 -586.0
(0.048) (117.8)
Chronic * ADL Change 0.024 -87.9
(0.038) (99.0)
Accid * ADL Change -0.009 -31.6
(0.059) (149.3)
Decrease in Age75 Surv Prob 0.003 -9.7
    (change<-.20) (0.011) (33.7)
Past Age75 Surv Pr (0-1 Index) -0.054 57.5
(0.016) (39.2)
Acute * Survival Change 0.118 -237.2
  (0.050) (126.9)
Chronic * Survival Change 0.030 -70.5
(0.038) (101.4)
Accid * Survival Change -0.048 194.9
(0.066) (206.8)
R-Squared 0.111 0.130 0.101 0.061 0.072 0.064
Number of Obs 11,006 11,006 7,827 11,006 11,006 7,827
Note:
(1) Regressions include dummies for age, education, industry/occupation, and year, net worth and liquid assets.
(2) Standard errors are corrected for repeated observations on same individuals.
(3) Specifications 3 and 6 have fewer observations due to missing subjective mortality data.
Dep Var: Labor Force Exit Dep Var: Change in Hours
Table 2a: Effects of Own Health Shocks on Men' s Labor Supply
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Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Acute Event Dummy 0.097 0.040 0.031 -249.9 -150.5 -170.8
(0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (46.8) (50.3) (59.1)
Chronic Illness Dummy 0.043 0.027 0.037 -86.4 -67.3 -96.1
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (32.9) (36.6) (37.5)
Accident Dummy 0.001 -0.031 -0.034 36.0 101.3 87.3
(0.026) (0.027) (0.031) (62.6) (66.6) (83.8)
Increase in ADL Dummy 0.080 -167.7
     (change>=4 activities) (0.017) (40.6)
Past ADL (0-1 Index) 0.215 -293.9
(0.032) (61.7)
Acute * ADL Change 0.189 -339.2
(0.056) (121.6)
Chronic * ADL Change 0.039 -9.7
(0.041) (91.2)
Accid * ADL Change 0.068 -167.0
(0.068) (158.2)
Decrease in Age75 Surv Prob 0.001 25.0
    (change<-.20) (0.012) (30.3)
Past Age75 Surv Pr (0-1 Index) -0.008 -6.0
(0.017) (36.0)
Acute * Survival Change 0.132 -48.7
  (0.055) (121.7)
Chronic * Survival Change -0.010 102.9
(0.038) (95.1)
Accid * Survival Change 0.085 -294.2
(0.083) (212.9)
R-Squared 0.085 0.099 0.084 0.038 0.045 0.042
Number of Obs 9,592 9,592 8,188 9,592 9,592 8,188
Note:
(1) Regressions include dummies for age, education, industry/occupation, and year, net worth and liquid assets.
(2) Standard errors are corrected for repeated observations on same individuals.
(3) Specifications 3 and 6 have fewer observations due to missing subjective mortality data.
Dep Var: Labor Force Exit Dep Var: Change in Hours
Table 2b: Effects of Own Health Shocks on Women' s Labor Supply
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spouse Health Variables
Acute Event -0.022 61.7
(0.015) (38.8)




Any Health Shock -0.014 -0.018 0.004 54.7 58.0 -34.7
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (26.0) (28.9) (36.9)
Increase in ADL Dummy -0.002 -35.3
     (change>=4 activities) (0.015) (43.6)
Past ADL (0-1 Index) 0.007 -7.3
(0.023) (52.5)
Any * ADL Change 0.001 29.1
(0.027) (76.5)
Decrease in Age75 Surv Prob -0.012 11.7
    (change<-.20) (0.013) (35.1)
Past Age 75 Surv Pr (0-1 Index) 0.024 -55.1
(0.017) (44.4)
Any * Survival Change -0.024 108.3
(0.029) (80.5)
R-Squared 0.115 0.109 0.128 0.106 0.065 0.062 0.728 0.757
Number of Observations 10,690 10,690 10,646 6,722 10,690 10,690 10,646 6,722
Note:
(1) All regressions include the same own health shock variables; coefficients are very similar to those on Table 2a.
(2) Regressions include dummies for age, education, industry/occupation, and year, net worth and liquid assets.
(3) Standard errors are corrected for repeated observations on same individuals.
Change in Hours Exit Labor Force Variable
Table 3a: Effects of Spouse' s Health Shocks on Men' s Labor Supply
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spouse Health Variables
Acute Event 0.005 -17.1
(0.014) (32.8)




Any Health Shock 0.008 0.000 -0.009 -10.5 4.6 13.9
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (23.5) (25.4) (35.5)
Increase in ADL Dummy -0.035 -27.3
     (change>=4 activities) (0.016) (43.1)
Past ADL (0-1 Index) -0.005 -21.2
(0.027) (58.7)
Any * ADL Change 0.060 -41.2
(0.029) (70.4)
Decrease in Age75 Surv Prob -0.027 66.7
    (change<-.20) (0.015) (40.1)
Past Age 75 Surv Pr (0-1 Index) 0.017 -64.7
(0.019) (42.0)
Any * ADL Change 0.058 -100.9
(0.033) (85.4)
R-Squared 0.099 0.096 0.112 0.100 0.047 0.044 0.052 0.053
Number of Observations 8,817        8,817        8,733        4,996        8,817        8,817        8,733        4,996       
Note:
(1) All regressions include the same own health shock variables; coefficients are very similar to those on Table 2b.
(2) Regressions include dummies for age, education, industry/occupation, and year, net worth and liquid assets.
(3) Standard errors are corrected for repeated observations on same individuals.
Table 3b: Effects of Spouse' s Health Shocks on Women' s Labor Supply
Variable Change in Hours Exit Labor Force
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Variable Wife' s Husband' s
Change in Change in
CoL Index CoL Index
Spouse Variables
Any Health Shock 0.095 -0.021
(0.039) (0.039)
ADL Change Dummy -0.095 0.331
(0.133) (0.116)
Any Shock * ADL Change 0.026 0.052
(0.091) (0.092)
Own Variables
Any Health Shock 0.088 -0.003
(0.041) (0.038)
ADL Change Dummy 0.016 -0.011
(0.121) (0.127)
Any Shock * ADL Change 0.052 0.097
(0.096) (0.087)
Past Comp of Leisure Index -0.419 -0.536
(0.020) (0.021)
Test of Equality of Spouse ADL 
  Change Dummy in 2 Models chi2(1)=5.72 , p=0.017
Mean Value of Depend Variable 0.028 0.039
R-Squared 0.194 0.259
Number of Observations 1,787 1,787
Note:
(1) Comp of Leisure Index is 1 if respondent says that time spent together with
spouse is extremely enjoyable, 2 if very, 3 if somewhat, 4 if not enjoyable.
(2) All variables refer to change in CoL Index, health, etc. between waves 1 & 2.
Sample is couples where both spouses were working at wave 1.
(3) Model is estimated via seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).
Table 4: Change in Complementarity of Leisure Index
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Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spouse Variables
  Any Health Shock -0.020 54.7 0.007 -2.0
(0.010) (28.0) (0.012) (27.4)
  Employer HI -0.017 -1.8 -0.010 2.4
(0.010) (28.5) (0.011) (24.3)
  Retiree HI 0.024 -68.5 0.004 -40.4
(0.013) (37.3) (0.012) (28.1)
  Retiree HI * Any 0.032 -11.5 0.008 -39.4
(0.029) (78.3) (0.023) (53.7)
Own Variables
  Any Health Shock 0.085 -168.3 0.049 -111.2
(0.013) (32.5) (0.014) (31.8)
  Employer HI -0.042 -127.0 -0.085 -38.5
(0.009) (25.3) (0.010) (23.3)
  Retiree HI 0.059 -97.7 0.051 -95.2
(0.009) (25.6) (0.011) (27.1)
  Retiree HI * Any -0.008 -13.2 0.017 -45.3
(0.022) (56.0) (0.028) (68.3)
R-Squared 0.113 0.069 0.104 0.0477
Number of Obs 10,646                   10,646                   8,733                     8,733                    
Note:
(1) Regressions include dummies for age, education, industry/occupation, and year, net worth and liquid assets.
(2) Standard errors are corrected for repeated observations on same individuals.
Table 5: Effects of Health Shocks -- Health Insurance
Change in Hours Labor Force Exit
Depend Var: Men' s Labor Supply Depend Var: Women' s Labor Supply
Change in Hours Labor Force Exit
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Variable
Exit Hours Exit Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spouse Variables
  Any Health Shock -0.039 -84.5 0.024 -52.9
(0.011) (47.2) (0.017) (46.1)
  SS-eligible (age 62+) -0.006 -22.9 0.044 -187.4
(0.040) (93.3) (0.037) (90.9)
  Pension eligible 0.010 -27.6 0.029 -34.1
(0.009) (20.9) (0.010) (20.0)
  Any * SS-eligible 0.000 79.1 0.001 18.4
(0.027) (71.0) (0.020) (47.2)
  Any * Pension-eligible 0.062 -66.1 -0.034 72.4
(0.020) (53.2) (0.019) (46.5)
  DI Applicant 0.030 -83.7 -0.001 77.2
(0.022) (90.2) (0.032) (89.6)
  DI Recipient 0.016 213.3 0.034 -296.3
(0.050) (134.8) (0.047) (139.3)
Own Variables
  Any Health Shock 0.050 65.5 0.015 -51.8
(0.016) (34.0) (0.016) (42.5)
  SS-eligible (age 62+) 0.242 -514.5 0.250 -140.9
(0.057) (170.3) (0.063) (131.0)
  Pension eligible 0.069 -96.0 0.007 -75.5
(0.009) (20.2) (0.010) (19.4)
  Any * SS-eligible 0.028 -22.5 -0.004 -6.3
(0.022) (57.5) (0.031) (70.7)
  Any * Pension-eligible -0.013 -40.2 0.028 -49.3
(0.019) (53.6) (0.022) (54.2)
  DI Applicant 0.542 -950.4 0.529 -1057.5
(0.045) (117.6) (0.046) (102.9)
  DI Recipient 0.190 -420.0 0.151 -115.7
(0.052) (148.1) (0.064) (139.2)
R-Squared 0.089 0.174 0.075 0.144
Number of Obs 10,690           10,690           8,817             8,817            
Note:
(1) Regressions include dummies for age, education, ind/occup, and year, net worth and liquid assets.
(2) Standard errors are corrected for repeated observations on same individuals.
Table 6: Effects of Health Shocks -- Retirement Benefits
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable: 
Men' s Labor Supply Women' s Labor Supply
 